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Abstract
In this paper, I extend the analytical framework of infrastructural citizenship with political ecology
and reorientate analysis to rural geographies, extractive infrastructure and indigenous territorial
movements. Drawing from recent fieldwork in Bolivia, I argue that an extended conceptual
framework of ‘infrastructural ecological citizenship’ better acknowledges the multiple, changing
and contested ways that people and rural places co-exist and how these relationships are being
reworked as infrastructure and citizenship are co-constituted. I use this framework to analyse a
conflict over road building in an indigenous territory and national park in lowland Bolivia – the
Isiboro Secure Indigenous Territory and National Park (Territorio Indıgena y Parque Nacional Isiboro
Secure; TIPNIS), revealing how the road building project weakened the pre-existing political and
material infrastructures that underpinned modes of indigenous territorial citizenship within
Bolivia’s Plurinational State, as well as foregrounding how transnational extractive capital has
shaped negotiations of territorial place-based citizenship in the TIPNIS. In doing so, I contribute
to debates on infrastructural citizenship, resource extraction and sustainable development,
revealing the ongoing potency of place-based claims on land and related claims for territorial
citizenship.
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In 2011, the Bolivian government began building a new road from Villa Tunari to San
Ignacio de Moxos to connect key regions of the country, secure market access for remote
areas and access unexplored pools of natural gas. Funded by the Brazilian National Bank of
Economic and Social Development (BNDES), contracted to Brazilian engineering and
infrastructure conglomerate OAS and linked to the Initiative for the Integration of the
Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA) (now South American Council for
Infrastructure and Planning COSIPLAN), this road fitted within a regional vision for
better infrastructure across Latin America. Ambitious plans for new infrastructure are
being advocated by bilateral development institutions and transnational capital as part of
a global turn to infrastructure-led development (Dodson, 2017). Regional agencies of the
United Nations (UN), such as the Natural Resources and Infrastructure Division (NRID)
of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), promote
a “paradigm shift” (Jaimurzina et al., 2016) as necessary to better connect the region and
enable the region to achieve sustainable development goals (see also Jaimurza and Sánchez,
2017). Although ‘infrastructure’ refers to both hard infrastructures (communications,
energy, roads, sanitation, ports) and soft (culture, education, health, leisure), financing is
currently being funnelled into transport infrastructure – seen in investments by Overseas
Development Assistance, Chinse trade/aid agreements, public-private partnerships and
nation states. In Bolivia, the Morales administration (2005–2019) prioritised road building
and the country ranks in the top six of Latin American countries investing into economic
infrastructure – primarily transport infrastructure and primarily roads (Jaimurzina et al.,
2016).
The 2011 road, however, was routed through one of Bolivia’s first national parks, which
forms a part of the Vilcabamba-Amboro Corridor and is one of the most biodiverse regions
in the country (USAID, 2008: 6). Since 1990, the park has been formally recognised as the
territory of Tsimane, Yuracare, and Moje~no-Trinitario communities, following the 1990
lowland indigenous March for Territory and Dignity. It has since been managed as a
double-category park, the Isiboro Secure Indigenous Territory and National Park
(Territorio Indıgena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Secure; TIPNIS). For those promoting the
road, the narrative of development has been central, with the road being used to promise
better citizenship, better education, better healthcare and better livelihoods. For those who
have opposed the road (initially as part of a 1000 person, 150mile march to the seat of
government), the road building project threatened their indigenous territorial rights, their
right to collectively determine the future of their territory, the ways their lives are imbricated
with place and they ways they value and protect nature. TIPNIS protesters wanted devel-
opment (McNeish, 2013) but forms of development that suited their territory – challenging
an overly simplified development versus conservation binary (Hope 2016, 2020a).
The TIPNIS conflict is much cited as seminal for understanding Bolivia’s recent (and
complex) politics of both pluri-nationalism and post-neoliberalism, introduced more fully
below (see Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012; Mamani, 2011; Yates and Bakker, 2014). It has
been analysed in detail as illustrative of indigenous development agendas (McNeish, 2013),
in critique of the Morales’ administrations claims to socialism (Webber), as a result histor-
ical land politics in lowland Bolivia (Fabricant and Postero, 2015), for how indigenous
environmentalism has been disciplined by an extractive imperative (Hope, 2016), as insight-
ful for understanding Bolivia’s decolonial territorial politics (Laing, 2012, 2020), for entan-
glements with global development agendas (Hope, 2020a, 2020b) and as informed by the
diverse and shifting political organisations within the territory (Hirsch, 2019). In this paper,
I focus on the road itself.
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Within social science, an infrastructural turn has brought changes to contemporary
conceptualisations of infrastructure. These go beyond physical materiality to examine infra-
structures as a manifestation of social and technological processes (Larkin, 2013; Lemanski,
2019: 3; Von Schnitzler, 2008). Urban geographers, for example, research unequal access to
infrastructure in cities and examine negotiations of infrastructure as negotiations of space,
rights and citizenship (Amin, 2014; Graham and Marvin 2002; Graham and McFarlane
2014). Lemanski (2019, 2020a, 2020b) has developed the analytical framework of ‘infra-
structural citizenship’ to foreground how everyday engagements with infrastructure are
implicated in everyday acts of citizenship. This framework enables a closer examination
of how dynamics of infrastructure, used primarily as a lens to understand urban life, con-
nects to debates about citizenship and socio-political life (Lemanski 2019, 2020a, 2020b).
The ‘infrastructural citizenship’ framework explicitly connects these debates and subse-
quently “highlights the links between the material and political nature of state-society
relations” (Lemanski 2019: 1). In this paper, I re-orientate the concept of infrastructural
citizenship towards rural spaces, resource geographies and indigenous territories. In extend-
ing infrastructural citizenship with political ecology, I examine road infrastructure as an
entry point to understanding the material and political dynamics of state-society-nature
relationships. Specifically, how claims for territorial citizenship both challenge and are
weakened by an extractive state.
I argue that an extended conceptual framework of ‘infrastructural ecological citizenship’
reframes our analysis to better include human/non-human relations and the ways that dif-
ferent modes of infrastructural citizenship enact, support and undermine different ways that
people live- with and -in a place. This extended conceptual framework offers insight into,
first, how place-based forms of citizenship (here studied in claims for territorial citizenship)
and people’s ability to protect and maintain these are changed by large-scale infrastructure
projects and, second, how mega-infrastructure projects promote forms of national citizen-
ship that are entangled with the extractive project. I both elaborate and utilise this extended
framework in an analysis of the conflict over roadbuilding in the TIPNIS, finding that that
the material-political geographies that underpin practices of indigeneity, conservation and
pluri-nationalism are being significantly changed by the dispute over the road, in ways that
undermine and marginalise claims and practices of territorial citizenship. This is first rele-
vant to debates about infrastructural citizenship, outlining how political ecology can extend
the reach of the concept. Second, this extended framework demonstrates the utility of
working with and across sub-disciplines. In this paper, working with analytical frameworks
from urban geography has enabled insight into the ways infrastructure, extractivism and
citizenship converge, whilst political ecology complicates treatments of rural geographies
that oversimplify the multiple and historical claims that people make on land and natures.
Third, this analysis contributes to debates on extractivism in Latin America, by demonstrat-
ing how the region’s extractive imperative operates through infrastructure. Fourth, and
finally, it is relevant to debates on sustainable development by contributing an understand-
ing of the perhaps unintended consequences that deepened partnerships between global
development, global finance and the private sector mean for wider trajectories of
sustainability.
This paper is structured as follows; first, I set out how I combine infrastructural citizen-
ship with political ecology and identify the questions and trajectories that emerge from this
extended lens. Second, I introduce citizenship in Bolivia, framed by key tensions between
discourses and practices of indigenous territorial citizenship and resource nationalism.
Third, I introduce the TIPNIS conflict and my methods. Fourth, I turn to my empirical
analysis to both elaborate and employ the infrastructural ecological citizenship framework,
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structured as Ecological Citizenship; InfrastructureþEcological Citizenship; and
Infrastructural Ecological Citizenship as Beyond the State. Fifth, my conclusion.
Infrastructural citizenship and political ecology
‘Infrastructural citizenship’ is an analytical framework that foregrounds ‘how citizens’
everyday access to, and use of, public infrastructure in the city affect, and are affected
by, their citizenship identity and practice’ (Lemanski, 2019, 2020a: 5). This focuses attention
on how ‘citizenship acts and practices are embodied in public infrastructure (and vice versa)’
(Lemanski, 2020a: 5). Infrastructural citizenship recognizes how citizenship is claimed and
demonstrated, for example by the self-construction of infrastructure, or clearly identifies a
lack of infrastructure as demonstrative of a lack of citizenship rights. Marginalized individ-
uals and groups, for example, are identified as “those with limited access to material goods
and public infrastructure” (Lemanski 2020b: 10). To date, the framework has been used to
understand how various urban infrastructures (for example, public housing, electricity,
water and sanitation) effect, create and constitute particular experiences of, and claims
for, citizenship (see Lemanski, 2019, 2020a, 2020b; Pesa, 2019; Silver and McFarlane,
2019; Wafer, 2019). In a related example, Amin has analysed how infrastructure reworks
struggles for recognition in Brazilian informal settlements and argues for the importance of
examining the social life and sociality of urban infrastructure (Amin, 2014). For Amin,
infrastructure in Brazil acts as a political intermediary that shapes the rights to the city of
those living in poverty, as well as directly influences their capacity to claim those rights. A
city’s infrastructure (roads, services and utilities) is subsequently understood as implicated in
‘the making of urban functionality, sociality and identity’ (Amin 2014: 137). In this paper, I
analyse the TIPNIS road as a political intermediary that lessens the claims that TIPNIS
leaders can make for place-based development, nature, and politics, in the face of consensus
between agendas for sustainable development and extractive-led growth (see Hope, 2020b).
Globally, the G-20 predict that current rates of investment in new infrastructure will
amount to $78.8trillion by 2040 (Global Infrastructure Hub, 2019). In Latin America,
commitments to infrastructure are also escalating (Bebbington et al., 2020). The Initiative
for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA) is now remodelled
as COSIPLAN and continues ambitious plans for transport infrastructure to connect 10
Development and Integration Axes across the region. In addition, there is a rising number of
south–south trade agreements being made with China (Chauvet et al., 2020; Gonzalez-
Vicente R, 2012), Oversea Development Assistance (UN, 2018: 5, 11) and other Public-
Private financing schemes (ECLAC, 2019; ECLAC, 2018: 28). New highways, waterways,
railways, ports, dams, power stations, infrastructure supporting extractive industry and
urban infrastructure for expanding cities are anticipated for the region, including in the
Amazon basin (Bebbington et al., 2020). To date, the building of new roads in Latin
America has been researched from a number of different perspectives. For development
policy makers, like the World Bank and UN, the focus has been on the economic costs of an
infrastructural gap (Easterly and Serven, 2003; Jaimurzina et al., 2016; Larde, 2016). From
this perspective, a lack of transport infrastructure is identified as a key barrier to economic
growth. The work of anthropologists Harvey and Knox has examined the enchantments of
road infrastructure and its affective force, as technologies that are understood to mean
progress and development, despite numerous examples where they have failed to deliver
(Harvey and Knox, 2012). They question why roads remain so well supported, despite often
failing on their promises. Recent efforts to improve transport infrastructure have been
identified as part of Latin America’s new commodity consensus (Svampa, 2015), driven
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by the new frontiers of resource extraction across the region. Significant investments into
new roads across the region, for example those backed by COSIPLAN, state leaders and
Chinese partnerships, are being studied for the socio-political effects they are having on the
Amazon (Jenkins et al., 2008; Van Dijck, 2013), for their relationships to neoliberalism
(Kanai, 2016; Riggirozzi and Tussie, 2012) and for what they tell us about the changing
power and geopolitics of China (Gonzalez-Vincente, 2012; Jenkins, 2012; Jenkins et al.,
2012; Moran et al., 2012; Myers, 2018). One recent study has investigated the environmental
costs of the new roads and railways required for resource extraction across the Amazon,
finding it significant (and detrimental) for forest degradation and demonstrating the wider
environmental costs of extractivism (Bebbington et al., 2018). In follow-up, Bebbington
et al. have set out a new governance agenda for mega-infrastructure, to better account
for the socio-environmental costs of mega-infrastructure projects and to ‘enhance the like-
lihood that infrastructure investment in tropical environments recognizes socio-ecological
realities and enhances the resilience of socio-ecological systems’ (Bebbington et al., 2020:
21832). In this paper, I also offer an environmental critique, examining how plans for a new
highway weaken claims for territorial citizenship, with implications for local socio-natures
and wider trajectories of sustainability.
Lemanski’s (2019: 590) work on infrastructural citizenship explicitly frames analysis of
infrastructure as necessitating an analysis of citizenship, as a route to better understand
socio-political life and the making of socio-material worlds. Going beyond a formal cate-
gory of membership into a nation, citizenship is here understood as a ‘flexible and contin-
gent form of political subjectification that emerges through iterative (and constitutive)
performances between the state and its subjects’ (Ong 1996 in Anand 2017: 9). Following
Anand, whilst formal citizenship promises equality, ‘the distribution of substantive civil,
political, socio-economic, and cultural rights among citizens has long been unequal’
(Holston and Appadurai 1996 in Anand, 2017: 9). Citizenship is thus unequal, negotiated,
claimed and enacted, for example when voting or in demands for sanitation, education and
health infrastructure (as explored in the literatures introduced above). For Lemanski, under-
standing citizenship as ‘a long-term relationship not a one-off protest” (2020b: 591) reveals
the significance of understanding how everyday citizenship is negotiated within public infra-
structure systems and how citizens imagine and claim their relationship to the state (ibid.). I
engage with debates on indigenous citizenship in Latin America (Cusicanqui, 2012; Hale,
2002; Radcliffe, 2015), which spans various decolonial agendas (Mignolo and Walsh, 2018)
and bids for plurality and ontological multiplicity (de la Cadena and Blaser, 2018; Escobar,
2020). In Bolivia, indigenous social movements, political organisations and politicians have
long demanded more substantive forms of indigenous citizenship. During the term of
President Evo Morales (2005–2019), significant (though contested) changes were enacted
in state legislation. Most prominently, in 2009 Bolivia became a Plurinational State, in
recognition of the multiple indigenous groups and governments in the country. The
Morales administration also set out a commitment to enhanced forms of indigenous terri-
torial autonomy and began a new political process to better recognise indigenous govern-
ments and territorial governance. In 2009, a new Constitution was enacted that committed
to Vivir Bien as the guiding principle of the state– an indigenous-led philosophy of ‘living
well, not better’ that stands in critique of hegemonic, stadial theories of development. In
practice, and as more fully introduced below, these gains have been much complicated by an
intensifying extractive regime. In Latin American rural geographies, the relationship
between infrastructure, rights and political capacity is differently inflected to urban geog-
raphies, complicated by concerns for how new infrastructure will transform landscapes,
natures, wildlife and territorial rights. New transport infrastructure, as examined in this
Hope 5
paper, changes existing ways of managing, using and accessing land, potentially disrupting
both human and non-human inhabitants. In this context, the extended framework of ‘infra-
structural ecological citizenship’ reveals the changing ways that citizenship relates to place
and the non-human, as new mega-infrastructures are built and as academic attention
increasingly shifts to urban life and processes of urbanisation.
Political ecology informs this extended framework, in foregrounding how natures are
made, treated and managed through culture, history and politics (Escobar, 2018). As an
interdisciplinary approach, political ecology evades simple definition (Neumann, 2014) and
has become a broad and dynamic field that ‘continues to explore new spaces, scales and
themes’ (Perreault et al., 2015: 7). Multiple strands of work analyse political ecologies of
resources and resource extraction (elaborated below), conservation (Arsel and Büscher,
2012; Brockington and Duffy, 2010; Brockington et al., 2012; Büscher and Fletcher 2015;
Neumann, 2015), cities (Heynen et al., 2006; Loftus, 2012) and more, attending to the multi-
scalar dynamics of power that are critical for the production, maintenance or hegemony of
particular natures.
Political ecology links people to place, for example by revealing how colonial histories of
land use and land change have produced particular practices, logics and landscapes (see
Adams and Mulligan, 2003) or by analysing how identity politics is implicated in the pro-
duction, management and treatment of nature, for example through the policy frameworks
that connect indigenous groups to territory (Anthias, 2018; Hope, 2017; Li et al., 2010) or by
gendered dynamics (see Harcourt and Escobar, 2005; Mollett and Faria, 2013). In this
paper, political ecology extends the utility and reach of infrastructural citizenship by con-
necting claims for citizenship to claims for natures – crucial in instances where new roads
and large-scale infrastructure are extended into conservation areas and indigenous territo-
ries. To an examination of infrastructural citizenship in Latin America, political ecology
adds a way to question how natures are being reworked and (re)produced as infrastructure
and citizenship are co-constituted. From this point in the paper, I use the term ‘infrastruc-
tural ecological citizenship’ to refer to this extended lens, to examine how infrastructure,
citizenship and nature inter-relate.
Development infrastructure in Latin America: sustainable
development, natural resources and roads
Agenda 2030, incorporating the 2015 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs), incorporates a response to climate change into global development targets, com-
prised of 17 goals, 169 targets and 230 indicators (UN, 2015). This shift offers a timely
response to calls to greatly reduce the human environmental footprint, found in debates
about climate change (IPCC, 2015), biodiversity loss (Apostopolopoulou and Adams, 2015;
Rockstr€om et al., 2009) and, more recently, the Anthropocene (Bonneuil and Fressoz, 2016;
Crutzen, 2006). A core rationale for both the wider agenda and goals, however, is to pro-
mote growth-led development and it relies on deepened partnerships with the private sector,
supporting a central analytic of economic growth over poverty reduction (Mawdsley, 2018).
This is reflected in the goals themselves, which include Goal 8 for ‘Decent Work and
Economic Growth’ and Goal 9 for ‘Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure’ (UN, 2015).
It is also reflected in calls for private finance to fund the goals and new partnerships between
the private sector and development institutions, which help to ‘normalize a radical shift in
development finance’ (Mawdsley, 2018: 191). Private sector representatives are being invited
to ‘drive and shape’ global development governance and policy by the United Nations, other
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multilaterals, and national development agencies (Mawdsley, 2015, 2018). The UN
Development Program ‘Mining Atlas: Mapping Mining to the SDGs’, for example, writes
that ‘it is our shared belief that the mining industry has an unprecedented opportunity to
mobilize significant human, physical, technological and financial resources to advance the
SDGs’ (UNDP, 2016).
Since the 2000s in Latin America, state-led development has been underpinned by a
regional resource boom and the extraction of natural resource wealth (see Bebbington,
2009). This has been exploited by governments on both the right and left, including in
Bolivia (Bebbington, 2009; Veltmeyer and Petras, 2014). Since 2015, agendas for sustainable
development have been agreed across the region. However, these remain entangled with the
region’s resource wealth, as a key source of economic growth (Hope, 2020a, 2020b).
ECLAC and NRID have done ‘extensive work . . . to lay the foundations for this paradigm
shift in both the national plans and regional physical integration initiatives’ (Jaimurzina
et al., 2016). This has involved, for example, national workshops for training, discussing and
implementing policies for sustainable development, ‘particularly in the areas of infrastruc-
ture, logistics and mobility’ (Jaimurzina et al., 2016). ECLAC undertakes research and
offers technical assistance, training courses, governmental meetings and technical work-
shops. Here, infrastructure is promoted as both directly and indirectly relevant to the
SDGs (Larde, 2016). Within the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (ECLAC), the NRID understands and promotes sustainable development as
entangled with drives to secure better infrastructure. Improved infrastructure is seen as
‘fundamental if the production apparatus and the economic system are to operate efficient-
ly’, as well as necessary for improving quality of life through greater access to social and
public services and people’s better integration into society in different ways, to increase
social capital and reduce poverty (Larde, 2016: 3). Various, interconnected infrastructures
(for example, for transport, energy and sanitation) are designed to secure ‘the structural
changes needed to achieve sustainable and inclusive development in Latin America and the
Caribbean’ (Jaimurzina et al., 2016: 1). Economic infrastructure is the first step in this, with
transport infrastructure a foundational component.
The need for better transport infrastructure across Latin America has been promoted
since 2000 through IIRSA (now COSIPLAN), a project led by 12 Latin American states and
funded by the Inter-American Development Bank, Development Bank of Latin America
and Fonplata, which wants to close Latin America’s ‘infrastructure gap’. IIRSA divided the
sub-continent into 10 integration and development hubs and sets out a new transport system
within and across these corridors. Primarily, these enable access to natural resources and
their export to market. IIRSA and NRID worked together to address the data gaps for
understanding infrastructure across the region. Specifically, ECLAC has been supported by
the Development Bank of Latin America (CAF) (since 2012) and the Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB) (since 2014), to compile an infrastructure database for every
country in the region (Larde, 2016). In most countries in the region, the largest investments
in infrastructure have been in transport infrastructure, despite NRID noting that a lack of
sustainability criteria is particularly evident in decisions on economic infrastructure
(Jaimurzina et al., 2016; Larde, 2016: 8, 11). Chile, Colombia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru
and the Plurinational State of Bolivia are investing the most state resources in transport
infrastructure (Larde, 2016: 8). In Bolivia, state plans are connected to regional initiatives
that promote roads as a first step in building the wider infrastructure needed for Latin
America to secure inclusive and sustainable development. National Development Plans
are thus entangled with both regional and global development frameworks and initiatives.
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Bolivian Citizenship: indigeneity, territory and resource nationalism
In the early 2000s, Bolivia was looked to as one of the most radical and progressive coun-
tries in Latin America’s so-called Pink Tide (Goodale and Postero, 2013; Kohl and
Farthing, 2006), following successes in overthrowing neoliberal reforms (namely, the
attempted privitisation of water in Cochabamba in 2000) and demands to re-nationalise
natural resources, primarily natural gas, and redistribute profits. In 2005, indigenous
President Evo Morales was elected on the back of significant social movement mobilisations
(see Harten, 2013; Kohl and Farthing, 2006). He promised a government by social move-
ment and enacted the 2005 Unity Pact, a mechanism to formally bring indigenous social
movement organisations into government (this fell apart after the TIPNIS conflict). In the
2009 Constitution, the country was formally re-named a Plurinational State, recognising the
multiple nations, histories, knowledges and cosmologies within Bolivia and constituting a
process for ‘territorial resignification and demographic occupation of state territory by
multiple social movements’ (Mamani, 2011: 32). Since the fall of Evo Morales in 2019,
Bolivia’s politics have been turbulent and marked by a return to state violence, state
racism, civil unrest and claims of US interference. At the time of writing, Morales’ party,
the MAS, had just been re-elected.
During the Morales administration, a political process to strengthen indigenous territo-
rial autonomy was introduced (in 2009), extending existing debates about indigenous terri-
torial rights and citizenship (Gustafson, 2002; Radcliffe, 2012). A Ministry for Autonomy
was set up to extend the territorial rights ceded in the 1990s and to oversee applications for
enhanced forms of autonomy. Claims for territory are much studied in Latin America, as
significantly different to Westphalian understandings of territory as the nation-state and
instead defined broadly as ‘the appropriation of space in pursuit of political projects’
(Halvorsen, 2019: 1). In Bolivia, indigenous territories have been understood as an ethno-
environmental fix (Anthias and Radcliffe, 2015) and as hybrid spaces that have co-
constituted indigeneity with conservation (Hope, 2017). Dynamics of territorial autonomy
in Bolivia, however, have increasingly been understood in relation to intensifying commit-
ments to the extraction of natural gas, as the subsoil has remained under the tight grip of the
state (Bebbington and Bury, 2013). Where territories overlap with the country’s biggest
reserves, hydrocarbon extraction has been studies for how it leads to forms of hydrocarbon
citizenship – where citizenship claims are intertwined with the political economy of hydro-
carbon extraction (Anthias, 2018). In the TIPNIS, claims for territory have been understood
as shifting within the changing political conditions of Latin America’s extractive imperative
and by the tensions created between resource nationalism and indigenous self-determination
(Laing, 2020).
These recent political shifts in Bolivia have also been studied for what they mean for the
changing power and meaning of indigeneity. The election of an indigenous President, for
example, has been significant for how indigeneity has been articulated, claimed and mobi-
lised across the country. For Postero (2017), in her analysis of an indigenous state, indige-
neity has been transformed in Bolivia from site of emancipatory politics to site of liberal
nation-state building. For Canessa (2014), indigeneity has been used by Morales in nation
building, for example through the promotion of pan-indigenous celebrations and traditions.
He argues that as indigeneity has become mobilised in this nation building project, we need
to adjust our conceptualisation of indigeneity. As an identity no longer marginal to a
powerful, settler state, Canessa (2014) argues that we now need to acknowledge both major-
ity and minority indigeneities – to better acknowledge the shifting experiences, claims and
inequalities of indigeneity. Within the new state project of the MAS, indigenous
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cosmovisions and knowledges were mainstreamed, primarily by the 2009 constitution. This
identifies Vivir Bien as the guiding principle of the state. Drafted by contemporary indige-
nous scholars in critique of hegemonic logics and practices of development, Vivir Bien
(Buen Vivir and sumak kawsay in Ecuador) has been developed from indigenous cosmovi-
sions, socio-natures and ontologies in response to post-development debates and calls for
alternatives to development. Vivir Bien decentres economic growth as marker of progress,
instead promoting living well within your community and in harmonious relationships with
the non-human (Gudynas, 2011; Walsh, 2010, 2011). From an environmental perspective,
Vivir Bien compliments other ways that indigenous environmentalism was articulated by
Morales during his first term. The then President was vocal (for example, at the UN COP21
in Paris) in promoting indigenous environmentalism in critique of capitalism. In 2010,
Morales hosted the World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of
Mother Earth, inviting indigenous groups from around the world to propose routes out
of climate change. In 2011, after campaigning from indigenous social movement organisa-
tions, Bolivia enacted the Law of the Rights of Mother Earth. This assigned rights to nature,
as an alternative to marketized conservation mechanisms.
Such initiatives, however, have been contested and undermined by intensifying commit-
ments to the extraction of Bolivia’s natural resources, particularly natural gas. The 2011
Law of Mother Earth, for example, was enacted with a clause that removes rights for nature
below the subsoil, thus remaining available for extraction (Bebbington and Bury, 2013). The
2010 World People’s Conference was hampered by protests by Mesa 18, an intervention
from Bolivian social movements to raise awareness of the contradictions being caused by
resource extraction within Bolivia. The implementation and uptake of Vivir Bien has been
similarly contentious and varied in both Bolivian and Ecuador, with significant differences
in how it has been operationalized by states and understood by indigenous communities
(Radcliffe, 2015; Gudynas, 2016). In Bolivia, Vivir Bien, has been aligned to roads, indus-
trialisation and extractivism by the central government and has come to be seen as the
language of those advocating neo-extractive development, over the agendas of local terri-
tories and movements (Andreucci and Radhuber, 2017; Hope, 2020a, 2020b). In Bolivia (as
across much of Latin America) progressive agendas (including for the redistribution of land
and power) have been challenged and limited by intensifying and unprecedented commit-
ments to the extraction of natural resources. For Arsel et al. (2016: 1), this evidences an
extractive imperative, meaning ‘the totality of a set of political economic relationships over
nature and natural resources that shape state-society interactions’. Identifying an extractive
imperative in Bolivia frames an examination of how citizenship, specifically the plural forms
of territorial indigenous citizenship demanded by social movements, relates to place/terri-
tory, the state, and global extractive networks and markets. An analysis of infrastructural
ecological citizenship reveals one way that the transformative potential of Vivir Bien has
been limited and disciplined by the extractive project, as well as another dynamic of the
extractive imperative.
Extractivism is here defined as a ‘pattern of accumulation based on the overexploitation
of generally nonrenewable natural resources, as well as the expansion of capital’s frontiers
toward territories previously considered nonproductive’ (Svampa, 2015: 66). This recognises
underlying ways of valuing and treating the environment (in terms of its wholesale exploi-
tation), as well as foregrounding consensus around the large-scale export of raw materials,
such as hydrocarbons (gas and petroleum), metals and minerals (copper, gold, silver,
tin, bauxite, zinc, etc.), agricultural products (corn, soy, and wheat), and biofuels
(Svampa, 2015). Whilst Latin America has long been mined for its natural resource
wealth, in the early 2000s global demand for the region’s metals, oils and natural gas
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intensified – evidenced by rising global investments in the region (Bebbington, 2009). The
subsequent ‘super cycle’ of growth in mineral and gas production was ‘historically unprec-
edented in terms of its magnitude and velocity’ (Bebbington and Bury, 2013: 38). For
Svampa, Latin America has switched from ‘the Washington Consensus with its focus on
finance to the Commodities Consensus based on the large-scale export of primary products’
(Svampa, 2015: 117). This consensus has been identified as constituting ‘a new economic and
political order’ sustained by a surge in global demand for raw materials (Svampa, 2015: 117).
Commitments to resource extraction have already been understood in relation to citizen-
ship. Koch and Perreault, for example, define resource nationalism as ‘a political discourse,
applied to political and economic thinking about how a state and its population should
manage and distribute profits derived from natural resources’ (Koch and Perreault, 2019:
611–612), as well as a way of constructing the imagined community of the nation (Anderson,
1991 in Koch and Perreault, 2019: 611–612). A core rationale of resource nationalism is that
it is the nation that should benefit from resources and not private entities or transnational
capital (Koch and Perreault, 2019). As nation states assert economic and political control
over natural resources, they invoke a discourse of the ‘nation’ and ‘create geographies where
the imaginaries of resources intersect with notions of rights, identity and citizenship’ (Childs,
2016: 540). In Bolivia, discourses of nationalism have come to underpin expanding extrac-
tive frontiers and stifle dissent, as well as shaping the frames of social movement responses
(Pellegrini, 2016). Resource nationalism, however, does not always involve a state-centric
understanding of resource governance (Bakker and Bridge, 2008). In Bolivia, for example, it
is also a discourse of particular (and powerful) Andean social movements (Kohl and
Farthing, 2012). Here, an analysis of infrastructural ecological citizenship in the TIPNIS
conflict offers an understanding of how negotiations of territorial indigenous citizenship
encounter resource nationalism.
Extractive-led development is promoted as bringing significant rises in GDP, distributed
through new social welfare mechanisms that are lowering rates of extreme poverty and
inequality. Between 2006 and 2015, extreme poverty was reduced by more than 20%
(from 38% to 16.8%), while moderate poverty fell by 21%. Taken together, this meant
improvements for some 1.4 million Bolivians (ONU Bolivia, 2018: 9). This was reliant,
however, on a neoextractive development model and expanding extractive frontiers
(mainly into lowland regions). In 2015, the Bolivian government set out commitments to
becoming the ‘energy heart’ of Latin America, with plans for fracking, hydropower (see
Atkins and Hope, 2021) and solar farms. This has required significant investments in trans-
port infrastructure, to access and export resources. From 2006 to 2019, for example, the
Morales administration has built 39,546km of duel carriageways across Bolivia, with
45,424km under construction and 20,105km in the planning stages (ABC, 2018). The gov-
ernment also invests in improving, extending and widening existing roads. For Pellegrini, the
neoextractivist development model (reclaiming and exploiting the country’s natural resource
wealth for the benefit of the Bolivian people) builds on older ideas about development and
extraction in Bolivia, evidenced by a 1956 Pablo Solon mural that hangs in the offices of the
state-owned hydrocarbon company, Yacimientos Petrolıferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB).
The mural depicts and unites themes of resource extraction, development and citizenship,
with the painting used as a way to ‘re- interpret history, educate the population and direct
secular hopes’ (Pellegrini, 2018). In this way, the mural demonstrates that themes of extrac-
tion and development have long been used to shape the imaginary of the nation, at least by
certain central governments (Pellegrini, 2018). What the mural does not depict, however, are
the particularities of how extraction is done, financed and extended, nor how state-run
resource extraction fits to a wider (and changing) political economy. What has changed
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for Bolivia, and what is new about contemporary commitments to infrastructure, are the
legacies of global neoliberal restructuring, contemporary dynamics of infrastructure invest-
ment and the accumulative and worsening effects of fossil fuel extraction and resource
depletion – on reserves, environments, economies and new extractive frontiers. In this
paper, the realisation of these themes (and their impacts on people-planet relations) is
explored through an examination of how contemporary and exceptional investments in
mega-infrastructure are reshaping citizen-led political ecologies.
Road building in the TIPNIS, Bolivia
The territory and case study referred to in this paper is the Territorio Indigena y Parque
Nacional Isiboro Secure; Isiboro Secure Indigenous Territory and National Park (TIPNIS).
The TIPNIS spans 1.2 million hectares of tropical forest and two Amazonian tributary
rivers – the Rio Secure and the Rio Isiboro. It was one of Bolivia’s first national parks,
recognised as the historical territory of Tsimane, Yuracare, and Moje~no-Trinitario indige-
nous communities only after the 1990 lowland Indigenous March for Territory and Dignity.
Since the 1990s, it has been co-managed by SERNAP (the National Park Service: El Servicio
Nacional de Areas Protegidas) the state ministry for conservation, and by rotational indig-
enous leaders who represent the 64 communities within the territory. The majority of com-
munities reside in small settlements along the riverbanks to the North-east of the park and
belong to two governing authorities, the TIPNIS Subcentral and the smaller, Secure
Subcentral, which is subordinate to the first. The southern point of the territory crosses
departmental borders into the Department of Cochabamba. It has more recently become
home to Quechua and Aymara communities, who have been migrating into the park to
grow coca since the 1970s (Saavedra, 2011; Webber, 2012). This section of the park is named
Polygon 7 and has a separate governing authority, The Indigenous Council of the South
(CONISUR). SERNAP also manages this part of the park and monitors its border.
In 2011, the government started building a road through the TIPNIS – planned to run
past two large hydrocarbon pools (with hydrocarbons concessions already granted to a
quarter of the territory). This was the first major road in the TIPNIS, though there is a
small access road into Polygon 7 (that proceeded coca growers). The majority of the park
and territory, however, is accessed by boat or plane. According to legislation ratified in 1991
(before the election of Morales), TIPNIS communities should have been consulted before
road building began, under ILO 169 which stipulates Right to Free, Prior and Informed
Consent. They were not. In 2011, TIPNIS leaders met and decided to reject the road. They
led a month-long march to La Paz to demand that the road be stopped and territory
protected. The conflict gained national and international attention, as it contradicted
much of Morales’ early rhetoric and revealed in the public domain, for the first time,
some of the inconsistencies and pressure points of the Morales administration. In January
2012, march leaders met with the government, who agreed to stop the road and protect the
park. Celebrated as a victory, the marchers returned home (Bautista et al., 2012). Since this
victory, however, a number of U-turns have prolonged the conflict and muddied its effects.
Although the road is yet to be completed, the conflict over the road (and explicit negotia-
tions of infrastructure within this) has been significant in narrowing debates and practices of
territorial autonomy, Vivir Bien and nature.
This paper is based on a qualitative research design (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005;
Longhurst, 2010), and the knowledge and networks gained from ninemonths of fieldwork
in Bolivia between 2011 and 2012, threemonths of further fieldwork in 2017, and onemonth
of fieldwork in 2019. In total, 96 interviews were conducted, with TIPNIs leaders, other
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indigenous movements, development organisations (both national and global) and state
representatives. In 2012, I travelled within the TIPNIS for two weeks, as one of only two
foreign researchers, to attend a meeting of the territory. This visit to the TIPNIS, and
experience of travelling through it, provided key insights into how territorial politics
emerge from, and relate to, the specific geography of the TIPNIS, as well offering a
chance to observe the particular socio-nature of the TIPNIS.
Ecological citizenship
The ‘ecological’ element of the infrastructural ecological citizenship framework is intro-
duced in terms of how claims for citizenship enrol place and territory and analysed using
political ecology. If we define citizenship, or identify and study it, as something claimed and
practiced in everyday life, then in the TIPNIS conflict those opposing the road have claimed
citizenship via territory. This complex conflict has followed a long struggle for territorial
rights and autonomy (see Hope, 2016; Laing, 2012, 2019), for example many anti-road
campaigners marched to secure the first wave of indigenous rights in the 1990 lowland
March for Territory and Dignity. Those opposing the road have themselves recognised
the links between infrastructure and citizenship, and a core rationale for rejecting the
road was that the government had started construction without first seeking the consent
of those with territorial rights to the land (a legal requirement set out in ILO 169) (see
Bautista et al., 2012). As TIPNIS rights to Free, Prior and Informed Consent was not
respected, a number of other lowland indigenous territories (represented by the lowland
indigenous umbrella organisation, CIDOB) joined the campaign. They viewed the TIPNIS
road as a threat to all indigenous and territorial rights and I was told “First they will come
for the TIPNIS, then the others” (Raul).
Citizenship was also claimed via indigenous identity, as inextricably linked to claims for
territory. The TIPNIS road was partly opposed because it was seen to primarily benefit the
coca growers (cocaleros) in Polygon 7, as well as to enable their advance into the territory.
TIPNIS leaders explained their indigenous identity, role in conservation and ways of living
(and farming) within the territory as distinctive to the ways land was treated and used by
coca growers (Hope, 2016). However, an analysis of TIPNIS mobilisations of indigeneity
and conservation, taken together as a socio-environmental strategy set against a dominant
extractive agenda, has shown how these discursive categories are shifting in response to a
dominant extractive frontier and that those opposing neo-extractivism have less tools to do
so (Hope, 2016). Wider legislative and policy frameworks, for example, have been realigned
to the extractive project, such as in 2011, when the Morales administration opened up
protected areas for mining exploration (see Hope, 2020a, 2020b).
In Geopolitics of the Amazon, Vice-President Linera asserts that the suggestion that the
road will enable more coca growers to move into the TIPNIS is one of three ‘colonist
fallacies’, created by those opposing the TIPNIS road (2012). He argues that there are
currently no coercive measures to prevent people from entering the park but that coca-
growing unions voluntarily respect the agreed ‘red line’ bordering Polygon 7 (linea roja).
Prior to the dispute over the road, however, a number of conflicts between coca growers and
TIPNIS communities were documented in the national press. In June 2006, for example, the
national newspaper El Deber reported conflicts caused by migration into the territory
(Indigenas denuncian agresiones en el TIPNS). Conflicts between TIPNIS communities
and coca-growers was again reported in September 2009 in another national newspaper,
El Diario, (Cocaleros atacan a indigenas TIPNIS). SERNAP wardens also identified the
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challenge of maintaining TIPNIS borders as the reason why their job was dangerous. This is
illustrated in the quote below, from an interview with a TIPNIS conservation warden:
‘.In reality, all the national protected areas have problems with illegal settlements and the exploi-
tation of resources. This is our work, to guard the parks . . .. (our job is) very dangerous, very
dangerous because there are narco traffickers and people illegally logging . . .Sometimes these
people are armed . . .. it is very dangerous for us’ (Alex).
For TIPNIS leaders, a key problem with the road was that it was undermining indigenous
territorial rights whilst enabling access for others, as explained below by a TIPNIS leader:
.where they want the road, we know that it will not benefit us, . . . it will benefit drug traffickers, big
businessmen and transnational companies . . . . we know that it will destroy our territory and will
contaminate the environment . . . and we will continue to be overwhelmed by coca growers . . . .
(Angelo)
Following this, and finally, citizenship was also claimed via the conservation value of the
TIPNIS and the conservation policies that have guided how TIPNIS communities live
within the park (in terms of farming, resource use and location), as well as how they
have experienced indigeneity (see Hope, 2017). TIPNIS leaders have argued that TIPNIS
communities play a vital role in protecting the forest and its wildlife – both crucial for global
fights against climate change. They speak of the TIPNIS as the ‘lungs of the world’ and, in
recent years, have co-ordinated their protest events with global days of action for climate
change, for example co-ordinating a 2017 protest march I attended in Santa Cruz with a
global day of action against climate change. In 2017, the TIPNIS Presidents travelled to
Germany to present their case to the COP climate courts, having already presented their
case in 2013 to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in New York. Those that
connect indigeneity to conservation are often treated critically within social science, for
example using theories of strategic essentialism (Spivak, 1988) or in line with past critiques
that crystalized set definitions of indigenous groups as closer to nature as both immobilising
and racist (see Hope, 2017). In the TIPNIS, however, the indigenous identity of its inhab-
itants has been co-constituted with conservation agendas and it is useful to examine the
policy histories and hybridity that links indigeneity to conservation in this context (see Hope
2016, 2017).
Within Bolivia, it is clear that some indigenous groups seek to benefit from extraction
and support expanding extractive frontiers (see Anthias 2018; Bebbington and Humphries-
Bebbington, 2011; Kohl and Farthing, 2012), as elsewhere too (Perreault and Valdivia,
2010). In this conflict, however, the TIPNIS opposition rejected extractive infrastructure,
claimed more site-specific forms of development and advocated for conservation (Hope,
2020a). Those promoting the road have suggested less convincing spaces for nature. The
state conservation agency, for example, appeared constrained by their subordination and
deference to the central government and was adamant that their work would not change,
‘road or no road’ (Interview 4). At various points, the central government suggested the
road would be built as a ‘ecological highway’ and possibly as a bridge over the forest. A
focus on infrastructural ecological citizenship reveals how the road project has weakened
those who are claiming citizenship via an autonomous indigenous territory (and govern-
ment) by undermining existing political and transport infrastructures.
These ways that citizenship has been claimed during the TIPNIS conflict have, in part,
been given meaning and significance by the infrastructure that links diverse groups,
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geographies and topologies across Bolivia. The TIPNIS political organisations, themselves
represented by CIDOB, represent communities that live in small hamlets, spread out over
1.2 million hectares and between two large rivers. Their political infrastructures are crucial
in securing and enacting ecological citizenship in the TIPNIS, by enabling negotiation with
the central government and relevant state bodies without requiring that TIPNIS inhabitants
leave, change or radically alter their everyday lives within the territory. As already intro-
duced, in 2011 TIPNIS community members left the territory to march for a month from
Trinidad (their nearest town) to the seat of government in La Paz. Protest marches have a
long history in Bolivia but are made significant by the distance travelled (almost 600 km),
the terrain overcome (from 130 metres above sea level to 3,640m) and the act of linking,
connecting and communicating between lowland, indigenous communities and the seat of
government. Though incorrect to assume impenetrable borders, these worlds are not well
linked by roads, trains, Internet or phone signal and so marches that connect the TIPNIS to
the central government are symbolically and politically powerful. The TIPNIS campaign
reveals how citizenship was claimed via (and for) territory, which itself depended on the
existing infrastructures that underpinned practices of indigeneity, conservation and pluri-
nationalism – all changed by the road building project.
InfrastructureþEcological citizenship
As already introduced, Amin (2015) has analysed infrastructure as a political intermediary
that shapes the rights to the city of those living in poverty, as well as directly influencing
their capacity to claim those rights. Such an analysis builds on understandings of how
citizenship is mediated, for example how citizens are represented to the state ‘through
third parties’ most often identified in ‘political parties, non- governmental organisations
(NGOs), community-based organisations, social movements, armed non-state actors,
networks and individuals’ and examined as operating in a particular historical context of
state-society relations (see von Liers and Piper, 2014). In contemporary work on infrastruc-
tures, this is extended to consider how hard infrastructures enact a form of mediation
between states and citizens. Building on the previous section, and in drawing from political
ecology, this helps us question how people and place are ‘multiply constituted, brought into
being and become political through different kinds of relations’ (Barry, 2013: 414). I here
examine the road infrastructure planned for the TIPNIS as a political intermediary that
lessens the ability of TIPNIS communities to claim citizenship via territory.
First, a lack of easily accessible transport infrastructure in the TIPNIS worked to obscure
the resistance politics within the territory. For communities in the North East of the terri-
tory (where the majority of communities live), travel is primarily by river and boat. When I
visited in 2012, we travelled for three days to reach a central meeting area used by TIPNIS
communities. As we passed through some of the larger communities in the park, I was
shown the remnants of barbed wire that had been stretched across the river to stop gov-
ernment boats from accessing the territory. It was clear that resistance within this part of the
park had been strong and was continuing. In the national media, however, the government
reported little opposition to the road, apart from a handful of troublemakers. The lack of
road infrastructure into the TIPNIS, combined with strict regulations on accessing the
territory, made this hard to disprove. As the conflict has continued, restrictions on entering
the park have increased. NGOs said in 2018, for example, that it felt near impossible to get
into the territory (interviews). The argument here is not that transport infrastructure would
necessarily aide the territorial politics of the TIPNIS. However, it does signal the need for
methods that enable communities to better monitor and represent territorial politics, such as
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recent projects in Ecuador where indigenous communities have monitored oil spills with
drones (see Mena et al., 2019).
Following protest marches against the road in 2011 and 2012 (and one led by Polygon 7
in support of the road in 2012), the central government undertook a consultation with
TIPNIS communities. They ultimately concluded that out of 69 communities within the
TIPNIS, 55 wanted the road (Consulta, 2012:14). This consultation was promoted as state
compliance with legal commitments to informed consent for indigenous territories (ILO
169), despite being carried out after road building had started. Following the consultation,
leaders of the TIPNIS subcentral approached Caritas and the Bolivian Permanent Assembly
for Human Rights (APDHB) to request an independent review of the government’s con-
sultation. In 2012, they published their review, which concluded that 25 out of the 35
communities they visited had rejected the government’s consultation and refused to take
part. Their report raised serious questions about the methods used in the government con-
sultation (Boliviana, 2013: 211). Crucially, the government consultation processes under-
mined state commitments to the institutions, political processes and practices that structured
how the TIPNIS engaged with the state. The government consultation, for example, ignored
collective decision-making practices and decisions. The Caritas review found that the gov-
ernment group arrived via boat unexpectedly to remote communities – those normally
represented through leaders and formalised hierarchies. In some instances, they asked chil-
dren to sign in support of the road (Caritas, 2013). The road building project therefore
disregarded and undermined existing territorial political infrastructure.
Second, an important dynamic of the road building project (and of infrastructural eco-
logical citizenship) in the TIPNIS has been to deny the indigenous citizenship of those
opposing the road, decreasing their ability to make claims for the territory. Most obviously,
dissenting organisations and leaders have been replaced by pro-government versions,
already documented elsewhere (see Andreucci and Radhiber, 2017). In the case of the
TIPNIS, there are now two CIDOB’s – one that supports the Morales government and
the one that opposed the road (now named CIDOB organico). CIDOB offices were seized by
the police and given to the pro-Morales organisation. In 2018, I attended a meeting of
CIDOB organico. We met in a Doctor’s surgery, an available space that they had been
loaned. The government’s politics of (mis)recognition was explained to me by an indigenous
leader, quoted below:
When there are dissenting voices, it is an obstacle, it is an impediment, and, when (the government)
fail to convince the people, . . . .what they do is to change the authority, as they did in the TIPNIS.
They have changed the authorities many times - until they get someone to agree. It is a very dirty
strategy. (Alfonso)
There are two key, fundamental challenges. The first is the infringement of my rights, my human
rights, as an indigenous person. The other is the infringement is to our rights to our own authorities
and decisions. . ..our rights, our nature, our forests and, in this case, our defence of our lives . . . if we
don’t defend this, it is a death. (Alejandra)
Those campaigning against the road, and for their territorial rights, have been forced to do
so without political recognition, with no public support from NGOs (Hope, 2020 b) and,
crucially, without funding. TIPNIS leaders understood the current conflict within a long
history of indigenous struggle but spoke to me of their shifting status, despite many years of
service securing indigenous rights. The road building project, and its weakening of territorial
political infrastructure, thus lessened the ability of oppositional leaders to make claims for
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the territory. The road building project was instead pitched as bringing development and
inclusion to the TIPNIS, speaking for the needs of the territory by erasing dissenting voices.
Third, during the TIPNIS conflict, the government made a number of visits to the
TIPNIS to formalise and promote national citizenship. In 2012 they undertook a documen-
tation drive within the park, to extend formalised national citizenship status into the
TIPNIS. Whilst I was doing fieldwork in 2012, only six months after the large march to
La Paz (the eighth march), the government sent boats into the park to document the
individuals living in the park. The benefits of connected, national citizenship was promoted
via the road building project, through promises of improved development and inclusion (see
Hope, 2020a, 2020b). In 2011 Morales visited communities in the south of the park, near
Polygon 7, and handed out TV’s and outboard motors. These were given as examples of
what they could expect from the road but for those continuing their campaign against the
road, they were seen as bribes. These ‘gifts’ helped complicate the unified position of the
TIPNIS communities (in opposition to the central government) and the territorial politics of
the TIPNIS subsequently became greatly complicated. As the conflict continued, alliances
within the TIPNIS weakened and some communities (particularly those nearest Polygon 7)
shifted towards favouring dialogue with the government. The citizenship offered via the
road, therefore, helped promote national citizenship over territorial citizenship, as a form of
citizenship that aligned to the wider extractive project.
The road building project thus acts as a political intermediary that lessens the ability of
TIPNIS communities to speak for themselves to claim citizenship via territory. Going fur-
ther, the ways that existing political infrastructures have been undermined as national cit-
izenship has been promoted suggests the particular difficulties of protecting and
campaigning for rural geographies and remote lives. Here, the material and political
nature of society-nature relationships are revealed, as they are challenged and undone by
the road.
Infrastructural ecological citizenship as beyond the state
Despite the majority of engagements with citizenship focusing on state-society relations
(Lemanski, 2020a, 2020b), a focus on infrastructure foregrounds the transnational influen-
ces that shape infrastructural ecological citizenship in Bolivia and reveals large scale infra-
structural projects as key sites of contact between place-based politics and global extractive
capital. Though the MAS administration renationalised the hydrocarbon sector in 2006,
they continued to contract to the transnational extractive companies needed for technology,
funds and expertise (Fabricant and Gustafson, 2016; Kaup, 2010). Bolivia contracts work,
for example, from Brazil’s state-oil giant Petrobras, Spain’s Repsol, British Gas, and
France’s Total (Fabricant and Gustafson, 2016). Shell returned to Bolivia in 2015 after
eight years of absence. The new transport infrastructure needed for extraction makes
these partnerships (and influences) newly visible in an analysis of citizenship. Those cam-
paigning against this infrastructure felt the pressure of these global networks, as shown in
the quote below:
. . . governments are in alliance with large transnational companies,. because it is not an interest
only of governments, these large projects are in the interests of transnational companies and done in
alliance with national governments, right? We are facing a struggle that is not only against the
national government, but also a struggle against macro-economic intentions. (Alberto)
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Similar concerns were voiced by civil society organisations, for example international NGOs
working in the country, quoted below:
. . .. unfortunately, I think that beyond the fear we have for (government) reprisals, we also now feel
frustration and almost . . . helplessness in the face of these projects, because we know that it goes
beyond the interests of the national government. (NGO3)
TIPNIS leaders also discussed the economic realities of challenging mega development
projects and the extreme choices they sometimes made to travel and campaign, as illustrated
in the quote below:
No one has money and no one is helping (with this). We only have the strength and heart of each
one of us, which keeps us here. . .and we help each other when we can – to eat, to travel, to return
home’. (Alejandra)
In a climate of contentious and divided indigenous politics, it is significant that those chal-
lenging extractive infrastructure are doing so with less financial resources. First, they stand
in stark contrast to the money and finance being sunk into new infrastructure. Second, it
means territorial movements lack the material resources needed to sustain ongoing cam-
paigning. The road building project is being aligned to the wider interests of bilateral devel-
opment institutions, in terms of their orientating logics for sustainable development, as
international NGOs feel less able to stand against national governments (Hope, 2020a,
2020b) – revealing the wider significance of the TIPNIS case. The lessening power of terri-
torial movements to maintain, protect and develop territorial citizenship (and within this,
place-based socio-natures) is significant for understanding how territorial citizenship fits
within, and can challenge, a wider extractive political economy (see also Anthias, 2018). As
the sustainable development agenda is being aligned to growth and extractivism in Latin
America (Hope, 2020b), the extended concept of infrastructural ecological citizenship draws
on political ecology’s scalar analysis to foreground how offers of national citizenship are
reflective of regional agendas for extractive-led growth, whilst place-based definitions and
practices of sustainability are being destabilized and undermined – despite their significance
for socio-environmental sustainability. The remit of transport infrastructure is to connect
places and people but this analysis has revealed how, in doing so, negotiations of society–
place relationships are being not only negotiated but marginalised – in ways that weaken the
power and dynamism of territorial citizenship.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that combining the analytical framework of infrastructural
citizenship (Lemanski, 2019, 2020a, 2020b) with political ecology extends the utility of the
framework to better recognise how the relationships between people and place are reworked
as infrastructure and citizenship are co-constituted. In long populated rural areas, this
foregrounds the multiple, changing and contested ways that people and place co-exist,
complicating analysis that explains extractive frontiers as planetary urbanisation. I have
proposed an extended framework of ‘infrastructural ecological citizenship’ and here used
this in an analysis of the conflict over road building in the TIPNIS, to examine how claims
for territorial citizenship were impacted by the road building project. Following Barry
(2011), with this extended framework I have questioned how people and place are brought
into being through different ways of relating, as shaped by infrastructure. The road building
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project undermined the political rights of the TIPNIS opposition, at the same time as
securing access to the territory for others. The infrastructural ecological citizenship frame-
work, however, revealed how the road building project weakened the existing political and
material infrastructures that underpinned modes of indigenous territorial citizenship within
Bolivia’s Plurinational State, as national citizenship was mediated and promoted through
the new road. The inclusion of political ecology ensured analysis of the multi-scalar politics
involved in new mega-infrastructure, revealing how the needs of transnational extractive
capital shaped negotiations of territorial place-based citizenship in the TIPNIS.
Taken together, this reveals both that TIPNIS territorial citizenship challenges the tra-
jectories of extractive capital and that the extractive imperative (Arsel et al., 2016) is partly
achieved through built infrastructure. The ‘infrastructural ecological citizenship’ framework
sharpens our insight into where the global sustainable development agenda is entangled with
resource extraction, through new transport infrastructure, and what that means for trajec-
tories of sustainability. In the TIPNIS, these entanglements lessen people’s ability to makes
claims for local socio-natures and sustainabilities, at the same time as revealing the ongoing
potency of place-based claims on land and related claims for territorial citizenship.
Highlights
• Extends the analytical framework of ‘infrastructural citizenship’ with political ecology, to
attend to the material and political dynamics of state-society-nature relationships.
• Examines how Latin America’s ‘extractive imperative’ operates through infrastructure.
• Extends our understanding of the global sustainable development agenda, demonstrating
how regional entanglements between sustainable development, resource extraction and
transport infrastructure lessen people’s ability to makes claims for territorial citizenship
and local socio-natures.
• Offers an empirical reading of how plans for new extractive infrastructure have impacted
the TIPNIS, Bolivia.
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